A comparable question arises: how to write on Adorno on Kafka? His essay by no means "shatters individuation," but it is in many places as hermetic as Kafka, the effect of marmoreal fragments fused together under rhetorical pressure to something solid and on the silk gown and begin to pronounce him, here, "Right!" here, "Wrong!" But this may amount to exactly that sort of instrumentalized reason that he c omminates, as merely adding to "the soothing façade to which a repressive reason (rationale Kontrolle ) increasingly conforms" (252, G 312).
The constraints under which one writes on Adorno in America also call for reflection.
Contemporary scholarly publishing requires that this essay be cited in English and treated in English. What the reader reads is Adorno in translation--ergo, Adorno in exile--the condition that such an essay as "Aufzeichnungen" (Notes) is supposed to get past. That is not the same thing as to "escape from": Adorno's only proper home, we know, is homelessness; and yet the change of address in 1945 from Los Angeles to Frankfurt portends a lesser degree of displacement. "Notes on Kafka" breathes in German; its ductus is freer; the exquisiteness of its word choice--the Parnassian face of a negative Reason--gives it a lustrous obscurity that for Adorno, I believe, marks precisely its origin in Europe--in Germany. But here a negative dialectic is also at work, for the traditionless Germany of the 1950s can no longer read such a diction, one that produces the resonances of meaning only as it alludes to the conventions that this same Germany has annihilated--in short: a style--or, precisely what, with the best will in the world, is lost in translation. Reading this essay in American is to enter a spectral space inhabited by two absences: the absence in the American idiom of room for so odd a monument of epigrammatic compression, and the historical absence of tradition to which it is offered in the spirit of defiant retribution. These aspects of A dorno's thought, except as they are conjured here, must, alas, go by the board--be carried away at sea--in what follows.
The American translation of this essay by Sam and Shierry Weber is competent, often admirable, up to the late point where it translates "Ladenhüter" (G 341) as "shopkeepers" (271), aiming for sensuous similarity with Kafka's word "Türhüter" (door keeper or door keepers), who--in the episode in The Trial "Before the Law"--guard the door that opens toward the Law.
(endnote: 4) The word "Ladenhüter" actually means, however, not "shopkeepers" but "white elephants," unsalable things that lie about gathering dust in abandoned shopwindows or in the back; and this mistake does grievously misread Adorno's thought, for Adorno has written: "As in the `Natural Theater of Oklahoma,' Kafka's world of ideas resembles a world of white elephants" (271). This is a different idea from saying that 3 Kafka's world is like the world of petty shopkeepers. Think of the lawyer-horse Bucephalus, Josephine the singing mouse, or even Gregor Samsa the giant vermin, none of whom are shopkeepers, though perhaps one does not want to think of them too insistently as white elephants either. Odradek--that hybrid, inorganic, irrepressible spool-and star-like creature (is he a dredl ?)--fits better.
(endnote: 5) But the Webers' mistake has an unexpected tutelary value: it is better than a mistake, it is an error, or part of the error throughout Adorno's essay, which presses all of Kafka's stories and parables into the service of a vast fable, told in
Freudian and demonic terms, of the capitalist reification of human consciousness.
Kafka's world of motifs and ideas is like a world of white elephants, Adorno continues, because "no theological principle comes so close to him as the title of an American film comedy: " Shopworn Angel" (271). Here, the "inner logic" is more persuasive than the logic. But, as I have suggested, part of the blame for the mistranslation is Adorno's, who compels his reader to read Kafka's parabolic figures as ciphers of the modern class history of goods and their relations--something that Kafka pejoratively called "property and its connections" ("Besitz und seine Beziehungen"), those things that "language" treats only because it is forced by its own practices to abandon its wish to address things "outside the sensate [sinnlich] world" (GrW 291-2).
Adorno first speaks of this "other sort of theology" in his correspondence with Benjamin, conjuring a Marxist-Freudian fable into which, unlike "existentialism"--or, for Herrmann Kafka. The link is an interesting one and owed to Adorno's logic. And yet, the passage continues, "As in the era of defective capitalism, the burden of guilt is shifted from the sphere of production to the agents of circulation or to those who provide services, traveling salesmen, bank employees, waiters." But what, now, is the relation of "the era of defective capitalism" to either the Third Reich or to Kafka's world? Is this era a third thing, to which these two worlds are likened, on the basis of the fact that in all three worlds "guilt is shifted from the sphere of production to the agents of circulation"? Or is it a thing that already pervades both halves of the binary of the Third Reich and Kafka's world? But this thing now sounds very little like the Third Reich, which was not notoriously set against "its agents of circulation," so long as these were not wandering Jews or Gypsies (certainly, traveling salesmen, bank employees, and waiters did their share in f illing the Party's rolls).
And this characterization sounds very little like Kafka's world, although on the point of making this judgment one must hesitate, too, since in one instance the "agents of circulation" in Adorno's text are correctly illustrated by Gregor Samsa, who is indeed a traveling
salesman. Yet "traveling salesmen" in this sentence are also associated with "bank employees," but the latter--bank employee--is not what Gregor Samsa is but just what Gregor
